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NOTES 
TWO TESTS UNITE TO RESOLVE THE TENSION 
BETWEEN THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
AND THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY 
Dora Georgescu* 
 
The right of publicity is an established legal doctrine that grants 
individuals the exclusive right to control the commercial use of their image.  
Though it has many important and laudable uses, one unfortunate 
consequence of the right of publicity is that it restricts artists’ abilities to 
portray real persons in their works.  In so doing, the right of publicity 
directly conflicts with the First Amendment protections of an individual’s 
freedom of expression. 
While the U.S. Supreme Court addressed this tension in Zacchini v. 
Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., the Court did not create a clear 
standard for balancing the interests of each right.  Without guidance from 
the Supreme Court, lower courts have developed four tests for balancing 
the right of publicity against the First Amendment:  the relatedness test, the 
predominant purpose test, the transformative use test, and the ad-hoc 
balancing test. 
Although most courts use only a single test to analyze the conflict 
between the right of publicity and the First Amendment, the Sixth Circuit, in 
ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publishing Inc., relied on both the transformative use 
test and the ad-hoc balancing test to form its analysis.  This Note proposes 
a test based on the Sixth Circuit approach, which creates a predictable 
standard for balancing the First Amendment against the right of publicity. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Electronic Arts, Inc. has created a series of National Collegiate Athletic 
Association (NCAA) football video games.1  One of the characters in these 
games strongly resembles the college quarterback Ryan Hart.2  Because 
Hart never consented to the use of his image in these games, he sued 
Electronic Arts for violating his right of publicity.3  Electronic Arts 
responded that the First Amendment shields it from right of publicity 
claims.4  How should this dispute be resolved? 
Determining the prevailing party hinges on how the court balances two 
legal rights between which there is an “inherent tension”:  the right of 
publicity and the First Amendment.5  While the right of publicity grants 
individuals6 the “exclusive right” to the commercial use of their image, the 
First Amendment seeks to protect freedom of expression.7  Artists, 
publishers, and other content makers routinely assert that the right of 
publicity curtails their freedom of expression by restricting their ability to 
use representations of real persons in their works.8  Thus, the right of 
publicity has the potential to suppress creative works and therefore 
undermine First Amendment goals.9 
The U.S. Supreme Court addressed this tension in Zacchini v. Scripps-
Howard Broadcasting Co.10  The Court’s holding, however, was tailored to 
the unique facts of the case and therefore did not create a clear standard for 
analyzing typical right of publicity cases.11  With no clear guidance from 
the Supreme Court, the lower courts have taken various approaches to 
balancing the right of publicity against the First Amendment.12  Four 
dominant tests have emerged:  the relatedness test, the predominant purpose 
test, the transformative use test, and the ad-hoc balancing test.13  Under the 
relatedness test, a title that uses a celebrity’s name will be protected by the 
 
 1. See Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 145 (3d Cir. 2013). 
 2. See id. 
 3. See id. 
 4. See id. 
 5. See ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 931 (6th Cir. 2003); see also 
Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, The Right of Publicity vs. the First Amendment:  A Property and 
Liability Rule Analysis, 70 IND. L.J. 47, 47 (1994). 
 6. Everyone has a right of publicity, however, celebrities are generally the plaintiffs in 
right of publicity cases. See Melville B. Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 203, 217 (1954). 
 7. James Barr Haines, First Amendment II:  Developments in the Right of Publicity, 
1989 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 211, 226 (1990). 
 8. See Pamela Samuelson, Reviving Zacchini:  Analyzing First Amendment Defenses in 
Right of Publicity and Copyright Cases, 57 TUL. L. REV. 836, 836 (1983). 
 9. See Michael Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image:  Popular Culture and 
Publicity Rights, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 125, 146 (1993).  This is problematic because states may 
not impose laws that can impair the freedom of speech. See generally Tinker v. Des Moines 
Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969); Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697 
(1931). 
 10. 433 U.S. 562 (1977). 
 11. See David Tan, Political Recoding of the Contemporary Celebrity and the First 
Amendment, 2 HARV. J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 1, 19 (2011). 
 12. Id. at 19–20. 
 13. See Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 153–64 (3d Cir. 2013). 
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First Amendment as long as it is not “wholly unrelated” to the contents of 
the work.14  Under the predominant purpose test, an unauthorized use of 
another’s identity is protected if the purpose of the work is predominantly 
expressive, but it is an infringement of the right of publicity if the purpose 
of the work is predominantly commercial.15  Under the transformative use 
test, a work that depicts a celebrity enjoys First Amendment protection if it 
is the artist’s creative expression rather than merely an imitation of the 
celebrity’s likeness.16  Finally, under the ad-hoc balancing test, courts 
balance the consequences of restricting a defendant’s freedom of expression 
against the justifications for a plaintiff’s right of publicity.17 
In ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publishing Inc.,18 the Sixth Circuit addressed the 
conflict between the First Amendment and the right of publicity by relying 
on both the transformative use test and the ad-hoc balancing test.19  This 
Note addresses the merits of the Sixth Circuit approach by examining the 
transformative use test and the ad-hoc balancing test.  While scholars have 
addressed the transformative use test,20 no article carefully scrutinizes the 
ad-hoc balancing test or the Sixth Circuit’s application of the transformative 
use and ad-hoc balancing tests together.  Thus, this Note fills the gap in the 
scholarship in two significant ways.  First, it examines the ad-hoc balancing 
test on its own terms, addressing in particular the justifications for the right 
of publicity.  Second, it examines whether the Sixth Circuit approach 
provides a predictable standard for resolving the tension between the right 
of publicity and the First Amendment. 
Part I outlines the development of the right of publicity and then 
examines the conflict between the right of publicity and the First 
Amendment.  Part II explains the Court’s reasoning in Zacchini and then 
describes the four tests that have developed to balance the conflicting 
interests of the right of publicity and the First Amendment.  Finally, Part III 
examines the Sixth Circuit’s approach, which relies on two existing tests.  
This Note concludes that a modified version of the Sixth Circuit’s approach 
should be adopted, because it creates a clear and predictable standard for 
resolving the tension between the First Amendment and the right of 
publicity. 
Without a predictable standard to balance the right of publicity against 
the First Amendment, it is impossible to predict with certainty how courts 
 
 14. Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 1004 (2d Cir. 1989). 
 15. Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363, 374 (Mo. 2003). 
 16. See Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 808–09 (Cal. 2001). 
 17. See Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959, 972 (10th 
Cir. 1996). 
 18. 332 F.3d 915 (6th Cir. 2003). 
 19. Id. at 936. 
 20. See generally Tan, supra note 11; F. Jay Dougherty, All the World’s Not a Stooge:  
The “Transformativeness” Test for Analyzing a First Amendment Defense to a Right of 
Publicity Claim Against Distribution of a Work of Art, 27 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 1 (2003); 
Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and the Right of Publicity, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 903 
(2003). 
2014] THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND PUBLICITY 911 
will decide a particular case.21  Art, mass media, books, and video games 
routinely depict real people, so legal uncertainty chills a wide swath of 
protected speech.22  Because free speech maintains “the integrity of the 
political process that constitutes our system of self-government,”23 it is 
imperative that the courts adopt a predictable standard to balance the right 
of publicity against the First Amendment. 
I.   BUTTING HEADS:  THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY 
AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
Before analyzing the courts’ various approaches for rectifying the 
conflict between the rights of publicity and free speech, it is necessary to 
briefly provide some background and overview of each of these rights.  
Part I.A defines the right of publicity and outlines its history, which began 
in a separate legal doctrine, the right to privacy.  Next, Part I.B explains the 
First Amendment doctrines that intersect with the right of publicity, 
including the distinction between commercial and expressive speech, and 
the newsworthiness doctrine. 
A.   The Right of Publicity 
The right of publicity protects individuals from unauthorized commercial 
use of their identity.24  It originated in the right to privacy, which is a “right 
to be let alone.”25  The right to privacy focuses on the victim’s mental 
trauma when his or her privacy is breached.26  However, it does not offer 
protection for famous individuals who have sought publicity.27  From the 
right to privacy evolved the right of publicity, which protects celebrities 
who want compensation for the use of their identity, regardless of whether 
this use has caused them mental distress.28  This section outlines that 
evolution. 
 
 21. See Peter L. Felcher & Edward L. Rubin, Privacy, Publicity, and the Portrayal of 
Real People by the Media, 88 YALE L.J. 1577, 1591 (1979). 
 22. Id. at 1594. The chilling effect of legal uncertainty is “a very real threat.” Id. at 1595. 
 23. Id. at 1597. Because celebrities are “widely recognized cultural sign[s],” expressive 
use of a celebrity’s image qualifies for “the highest level of First Amendment protection as 
political speech.” Tan, supra note 11, at 4–5; see also infra Part I.B.1 (explaining how 
artistic depictions of celebrities advance First Amendment goals). 
 24. See J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 1.3 (2d ed. 
2013); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 (1995) (stating that the 
right of publicity prohibits others from appropriating “the commercial value of a person’s 
identity by using without consent the person’s name, likeness, or other indicia of identity for 
purposes of trade”). 
 25. MCCARTHY, supra note 24, § 1.7. 
 26. See id. 
 27. See id. 
 28. See id. 
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1.   The Proposal and Debate of a Right to Privacy 
In 1890, Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis published “The Right 
to Privacy,”29 in which they argued that the press had overstepped its 
boundaries and intruded into individual privacy.30  They denounced an 
industry that, through public disclosure of embarrassing private facts, 
subjected others “to mental pain and distress, far greater than could be 
inflicted by mere bodily injury.”31  Drawing on Justice Thomas Cooley’s 
recognition that everyone has the “right to be let alone,”32 Warren and 
Brandeis urged the courts to create a remedy for those whose privacy had 
been violated and to include a “right to privacy” in the common law.33 
New York rejected the common law adoption of a right to privacy in a 
1902 decision in Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co.34  The court 
rejected the theme set forth by Warren and Brandeis, concluding that the 
right to privacy could not be “incorporated without doing violence to settled 
principles of law by which the [press] and the public have long been 
guided,” such as the freedom of speech.35  Noting the precedential effects 
of its holding, the court observed that it could not invoke a legal doctrine 
that had not yet been established.36  Instead, the legislature would be better 
suited to “interfere and arbitrarily provide” a statute to prevent the 
unpermitted use of one’s likeness for advertisement.37 
Three years after Roberson, the Georgia Supreme Court took the opposite 
approach in Pavesich v. New England Life Insurance Co.,38 and embraced 
Warren and Brandeis’ proposed right to privacy. 39  The court found that 
the right to privacy is an absolute right along with the rights of personal 
security and personal liberty,40 and adopted Warren and Brandeis’ 
definition of the right to privacy as a right “to be secure from invasion by 
 
 29. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 
(1891). 
 30. Id. at 196 (“The press is overstepping in every direction the obvious bounds of 
propriety and of decency.”). During Warren and Brandeis’s time, the press was known for 
prying into the private lives of many people. See MCCARTHY, supra note 24, § 1.13.  With 
over sixty newspaper articles written about Warren and his family, scholars have 
hypothesized that this law review article was a direct response to the press’s interference 
with his life. Id. 
 31. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 29, at 196. 
 32. Irwin R. Kramer, The Birth of Privacy Law:  A Century Since Warren and Brandeis, 
39 CATH. U. L. REV. 703, 710 (1990). 
 33. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 29, at 198. 
 34. 64 N.E. 442 (N.Y. 1902).  In this case, the defendants circulated about 25,000 
photographs of the plaintiff despite knowing that they did not have the authority to do so. Id. 
at 442. 
 35. Id. at 447. 
 36. See id. at 444. 
 37. Id. at 443.  The legislature followed the court’s suggestion; the New York statute is 
codified at N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50–51 (McKinney 1995). 
 38. 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905). 
 39. Justice Cobb denounced the court’s decision in Roberson as “the result of an 
unconscious yielding to the feeling of conservatism which naturally arises in the mind of a 
judge who faces a proposition which is novel.” Id. at 78. 
 40. Id. at 70. 
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the public into matters of a private nature.”41  While the Pavesich court 
recognized, as did the court in Roberson, that the right to privacy conflicted 
with the constitutional rights of free speech and the freedom of press, it 
trusted in the “wisdom and integrity of the judiciary” to strike the proper 
balance between these conflicting rights.42 
After the Roberson and Pavesich decisions, states were divided; some 
favored Roberson, while others accepted Pavesich.43  However, by the 
1940s, most states had recognized the right to privacy.44 
In 1960, William Prosser45 divided the tort of invasion of privacy into 
four separate categories:  (1) intrusion; (2) disclosure; (3) false light; and 
(4) appropriation.46  These four categories are distinct kinds of invasions 
and represent distinct interests of the plaintiff.  The first kind of invasion is 
defined as the “physical intrusion” into a plaintiff’s private life.47  This sort 
of invasion includes activities such as the physical harassment of 
overzealous paparazzi, “peeping toms,” and police officers searching a 
home without a warrant.48  The second kind of invasion is the “public 
disclosure of embarrassing private facts.”49  The disclosed information must 
be “embarrassing” from the viewpoint of a person “of ordinary 
sensibilities.”50  The third category that Professor Prosser identified is very 
closely related to the law of defamation.  This “false light” invasion of 
privacy requires “injury to human dignity” as a result of the public 
presentation of a plaintiff in a false light.51  The final category of invasion 
of privacy involves the unpermitted use of a plaintiff’s identity “with 
damage to plaintiff’s dignitary interests and peace of mind.”52  This 
category was the precursor to the right of publicity.53 
2.   The Evolution of the Right of Publicity 
Privacy law developed with a focus upon the “mental trauma incurred 
when one’s identity [is] widely disseminated in an unpermitted commercial 
use.”54  This conception became problematic when famous plaintiffs began 
to appear in court.55  These plaintiffs were not concerned with the 
 
 41. Id. at 72. 
 42. Id. 
 43. MCCARTHY, supra note 24, § 1.18. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Regarded as “a great Master of Torts,” William Prosser wrote numerous highly 
influential and authoritative works on torts. Christopher J. Robinette, The Prosser Notebook:  
Classroom As Biography and Intellectual History, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 577, 579. 
 46. See William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960). 
 47. MCCARTHY, supra note 24, § 1.20. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. § 1.21. 
 50. Id.  The right to privacy is not intended to protect those who are “abnormally 
sensitive about . . . publicity.” Id. 
 51. Id. § 1.22. 
 52. Id. § 1.23. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. § 1.7. 
 55. Id. 
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dissemination of their identity, but rather they wanted to “control when, 
where and how their identity was so used.”56  Because privacy rights had 
come to mean the “right to be left alone,” courts struggled with the claims 
for invasion of privacy of plaintiffs that had built their careers in order to 
gain publicity.57  As a result, courts limited celebrities’ ability to recover 
under right to privacy claims,58 and celebrities could not protect their 
economic interests under the right to privacy.59 
A Fifth Circuit case from 1941 illustrates this problem.  In O’Brien v. 
Pabst Sales Co.,60 professional football player David O’Brien sued Pabst 
Beer Company for using his photograph in its “Pabst Blue Ribbon” beer 
advertising calendar.61  The district court dismissed O’Brien’s invasion of 
privacy case.62  The court of appeals agreed with the district judge’s 
opinion that the association of O’Brien with a glass of beer “could not 
possibly disgrace [him] . . . or cause him damage.”63  Furthermore, because 
O’Brien was not a “private person,” the court reasoned that he could not be 
harmed by publicity because he had already been seeking and receiving the 
publicity imparted by Pabst Beer Company.64 
The dissent characterized O’Brien’s claim as one for a “right of 
property,” which belongs to everyone.65  Noting that the majority left 
celebrities without remedy for nonlibelous use of their image, the dissent 
focused instead upon O’Brien’s commercial value.66  Judge Edwin Holmes 
observed that commercial advertisers may take advantage of the publicity 
that celebrities have gained through their “talent and accomplishment” in 
order to “increase their sales,” without compensating the celebrities from 
whose name they profited.67 
The O’Brien dissent’s focus on property rights in the context of privacy 
rights was a step in advancing the right of publicity, but it wasn’t until 1953 
that these two concepts were explicitly linked.  In Haelan Laboratories, 
Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc.,68 the Second Circuit first used the term 
“right of publicity” and explained it as a property right in a person’s 
identity: 
 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. See, e.g., Gautier v. Pro-Football, Inc., 107 N.E.2d 485, 489 (N.Y. 1952) (denying 
damages); Miller v. Madison Square Garden Corp., 28 N.Y.S.2d 811, 813–14 (Sup. Ct. 
1941) (awarding nominal damages of six cents). 
 59. Nimmer, supra note 6, at 203–13.  Scholars have noted that the economic focus of 
the right of publicity makes it a “more practical” right than the right to privacy. See, e.g., 
Richard Ausness, The Right of Publicity:  A “Haystack in a Hurricane,” 55 TEMP. L.Q. 977, 
988 (1982). 
 60. 124 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1941). 
 61. Id. at 168. 
 62. Id. at 169. 
 63. Id. at 169–70. 
 64. Id. at 170. 
 65. Id. at 170–71 (Holmes, C.J., dissenting). 
 66. Id. at 171. 
 67. Id. 
 68. 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953). 
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We think that, in addition to and independent of that right of privacy 
(which in New York derives from statute), a man has a right in the 
publicity value of his photograph, i.e., the right to grant the exclusive 
privilege of publishing his picture, and that such a grant may validly be 
made “in gross,” i.e., without an accompanying transfer of a business or 
of anything else . . . . 
 This right might be called a “right of publicity.”  For it is common 
knowledge that many prominent persons (especially actors and ball-
players), far from having their feelings bruised through public exposure of 
their likenesses, would feel sorely deprived if they no longer received 
money for authorizing advertisements, popularizing their countenances, 
displayed in newspapers, magazines, buses, trains and subways.69 
Shortly after Haelan, Professor Melville Nimmer, an authority on free 
speech and intellectual property, wrote an article echoing the Haelan court, 
which established the right of publicity as a viable legal doctrine.70  
Nimmer noted that the doctrine developed by Brandeis and Warren, while 
sufficient “to protect the sensibilities of nineteenth century Brahmin 
Boston, is not adequate to meet the demands of the second half of the 
twentieth century, particularly with respect to the advertising, motion 
picture, television, and radio industries.”71  He reasoned that the celebrities 
working in these industries “do not seek the ‘solitude and privacy’ which 
Brandeis and Warren sought to protect.”72  Instead, celebrities wish to 
protect the use of their name and likeness, which have economic value.73  
Because this value could not be protected under a privacy theory, the newly 
recognized right of publicity was a more adequate legal doctrine for 
commercial misappropriation of one’s likeness.74 
3.   The Right of Publicity Today 
Today, the right of publicity is an established legal doctrine.75  It is an 
intellectual property right created by state law,76 and infringement of the 
right of publicity can result in liability for the commercial tort of unfair 
competition.77  While it is a distinct legal category, the right of publicity 
shares elements of both property and tort law.78 
 
 69. Id. at 868. 
 70. MCCARTHY, supra note 24, § 1.27. 
 71. Nimmer, supra note 6, at 203. 
 72. Id. at 203–04. 
 73. Id. at 204. 
 74. Id. 
 75. See Kwall, supra note 5, at 52. 
 76. Although the right of publicity is created by state law, its intersection with the First 
Amendment presents a federal issue. See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 
562, 568 (1977). 
 77. MCCARTHY, supra note 24, § 1.3. 
 78. Id. § 1.7.  The right of publicity is categorized as the commercial tort of unfair 
competition and as a form of property, specifically a form of intellectual property. Id. 
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Almost every state has recognized the right of publicity either by statute 
or at common law.79  Nineteen states have codified the right of publicity in 
statutes.80  Additionally, the Third Restatement of Unfair Competition 
recognizes the right of publicity.81  A prima facie right of publicity claim 
requires three basic elements:  (1) ownership of an enforceable right in the 
identity of a human being; (2) use by another, without permission, of some 
aspect of the plaintiff’s identity in such a way that it is identifiable from the 
unauthorized use; and (3) likelihood that the defendant’s use will cause 
economic injury to the value of that identity.82 
Despite the widespread adoption of the right of publicity, it is no clearer 
than it was three decades ago, when Professor Ausness characterized it as a 
“haystack in a hurricane.”83  To begin with, courts have not come up with a 
consistent test to determine what the right of publicity covers.84  While 
some courts have suggested that almost any recognizable characteristic is 
protected, other decisions have narrowed the right of publicity.85  Similarly, 
while some statutes are “drawn too narrowly” to protect only celebrities’ 
names, portraits, or pictures,86 “broadly drawn” statutes extend protection 
to include additional traits such as voice, likeness, and personality.87  Yet, 
perhaps the most troubling uncertainty about the right of publicity comes 
from its interaction with the First Amendment. 
B.   Tension Between the First Amendment and the Right of Publicity 
This section explains the competing interests of the First Amendment and 
the right of publicity.  In addressing the conflict between the right of 
publicity and the First Amendment, courts begin their analysis by 
determining whether the use of a person’s likeness is “expressive” or 
“commercial.”88  Thus, Part I.B.2 describes the types of expressive speech 
 
 79. Id. § 6.1.  California, Florida, and Wisconsin recognize the right of publicity through 
both statute and common law. See Christopher Pesce, The Likeness Monster:  Should the 
Right of Publicity Protect Against Imitation?, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 782, 794 (1990). 
 80. MCCARTHY, supra note 24, § 6.8.  Seven states recognize a statutory right of 
publicity. Arizona, Alabama, California, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, 
Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Texas, Utah, 
and Wisconsin recognize a common law right of publicity. Id. §§ 6.1–.127. Indiana, 
Massachusetts, Nebraska, Nevada, New York, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Tennessee, 
Virginia, and Washington have statutes protecting the right to privacy, which also embody 
the right of publicity. Id. 
 81. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 (1995). 
 82. MCCARTHY, supra note 24, § 3.2. 
 83. Ausness, supra note 59, at 978. 
 84. Felcher & Rubin, supra note 21, at 1590. 
 85. Compare Lahr v. Adell Chem. Co., 300 F.2d 256, 260 (1st Cir. 1962) (granting relief 
for plaintiff’s distinctive speaking style), with Sinatra v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 435 
F.2d 711, 718 (9th Cir. 1970) (denying relief for imitation of singing style). 
 86. Haines, supra note 7, at 216. 
 87. Id. at 219. 
 88. See Tan, supra note 11, at 16; see also Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363, 
373 (Mo. 2003) (noting that expressive works, such as those in Hoffman v. Capital 
Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180, 1185 (9th Cir. 2001), Cardtoons v. Major League Baseball 
Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959, 969–70 (10th Cir. 1996), and Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 
1003–05 (2d Cir. 1989), are fully protected, while commercial works, such as those in 
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that receive First Amendment protection and distinguishes protected 
expressive speech from less protected commercial speech.  To illustrate this 
rather elusive distinction, Part I.B.3 outlines two cases where courts found 
works that contained commercial elements to be expressive enough to 
outweigh the right to privacy.89  Finally, Part I.B.4 briefly describes the 
types of speech that are exempt from right of publicity claims under the 
newsworthiness doctrine. 
1.   Irreconcilable Goals of the First Amendment and the Right of Publicity 
The First Amendment “protects the dissemination of ideas and 
information.”90  The right of publicity significantly constrains the 
“dissemination of ideas and information” by limiting who can use celebrity 
images.91  In fact, it appears that the right of publicity “has been defined as 
if it existed in isolation from the First Amendment.”92  As a result, there is 
“an inherent tension” between the right of publicity and First Amendment 
rights.93 
To understand the conflict between the First Amendment and the right of 
publicity, it is helpful to understand two important goals of the First 
Amendment.94  First, it serves “‘to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of 
ideas’ and to repel efforts to limit the ‘uninhibited, robust and wide-open’ 
debate on public issues.”95  Because celebrities take on public meaning,96 
the use of their likeness may be important for an uninhibited debate about 
 
Downing v. Abercrombie & Fitch, 265 F.3d 994, 1002 (9th Cir. 2001), White v. Samsung 
Elec. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1397–99 (9th Cir. 1992), and Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 
F.2d 460, 462–64 (9th Cir. 1988), are rarely protected). 
 89. Although these cases address the right to privacy, they were brought under N.Y. CIV. 
RIGHTS LAW §§ 50–51 (McKinney 1995), which encompasses both the right to privacy and 
the right of publicity. See infra note 125 and accompanying text. 
 90. Ausness, supra note 59, at 1026.  The First Amendment provides that “Congress 
shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.” U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 91. Felcher & Rubin, supra note 21, at 1590. 
 92. Id. at 1590.  This may be explained by the fact that the right to privacy was 
articulated decades before free speech took a central role in American jurisprudence. Id. at 
1596 n.92. 
 93. ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 931 (6th Cir. 2003); see also Martin 
Luther King, Jr., Ctr. For Soc. Change, Inc. v. Am. Heritage Prods., Inc., 296 S.E.2d 697, 
708 (Ga. 1982) (Weltner, J., concurring) (noting that the right of publicity has “created an 
open-ended and ill-defined force which jeopardizes a right of unquestioned authenticity-free 
speech.”). 
 94. Professor Emerson explains that freedom of expression is justified on four grounds:  
(1) to assure “individual self-fulfillment,” (2) to advance truth and knowledge, (3) to secure 
society’s participation in social and political decision making, and (4) to balance social 
stability and change. Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 
72 YALE L.J. 877, 878–79 (1963). 
 95. Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Prods., 603 P.2d 454, 458 (Cal. 1979) (citing Gertz 
v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339 (1974); Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 
367, 388 (1969)). 
 96. Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 802–03 (Cal. 2001).  
Stars embody “the social categories in which people are placed and through which they have 
to make sense of their lives . . . categories of class, gender, ethnicity, religion, sexual 
orientation, and so on.” Stuart Hall, Introduction: Who Needs “Identity?,” in QUESTIONS OF 
CULTURAL IDENTITY 1, 5 (Stuart Hall & Paul Du Gay eds., 1996). 
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cultural values.97  Second, the First Amendment assures “individual self-
fulfillment” by allowing individuals to express their views.98  Creative use 
of celebrity images can serve as an “important avenue of individual 
expression.”99  By allowing celebrities to control how, and by whom, their 
images are used, the right of publicity has the potential to undermine these 
First Amendment goals.100 
2.   Distinguishing Expressive Speech from Commercial Speech 
Courts faced with the competing interests of the right of publicity and the 
First Amendment begin their analysis by determining whether the speech in 
question is “expressive” or “commercial.”101  Expressive speech and 
commercial speech are entitled to varying degrees of First Amendment 
protection, which in turn affects how each type of speech is treated in the 
right of publicity context.102 
Expressive speech is speech that conveys an idea or message.103  This 
includes the spoken and written word,104 visual art,105 video games,106 
movies, music, and live entertainment.107  Informative speech and 
entertaining expressive speech are equally protected.108  Conduct is also 
considered speech if it is intended to convey a specific message and if it is 
 
 97. Comedy III, 21 P.3d at 802–03. 
 98. Emerson, supra note 94, at 878–79. 
 99. Comedy III, 21 P.3d at 803. 
 100. Id. 
 101. See Tan, supra note 11, at 16; see also Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363, 
373 (Mo. 2003). 
 102. See Doe, 110 S.W.3d at 373. 
 103. George Vetter & Christopher C. Roche, The First Amendment and the Artist—Part I, 
R.I. B.J., 7, 9 (1996).  This need not be a “narrow, succinctly articulable message.” Hurley v. 
Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 569 (2011). 
 104. Vetter & Roche, supra note 103, at 8. 
 105. Bery v. City of New York, 97 F.3d 689, 695 (2d Cir. 1996) (“Visual art is as wide 
ranging in its depiction of ideas, concepts and emotions as any book, treatise, pamphlet or 
other writing, and is similarly entitled to full First Amendment protection . . . .  One cannot 
look at Winslow Homer’s paintings on the Civil War without seeing, in his depictions of the 
boredom and hardship of the individual soldier, expressions of anti-war sentiments, the idea 
that war is not heroic.”).  Although art is protected because it has “intrinsic value,” courts 
often look to the political value of the art as well. Tan, supra note 11, at 15.  Therefore, 
artwork generally must make political or social commentary in order to be granted First 
Amendment protections. See, e.g., Sefick v. City of Chicago, 485 F. Supp 644, 653 (N.D. Ill. 
1979) (holding that installations satirizing the mayor of Chicago and his wife constituted 
protected speech); see also Vetter & Roche, supra note 103, at 9. But see Close v. Lederle, 
424 F.2d 988, 990–91 (1st Cir. 1970) (holding that the nudity and sexual references in 
defendant’s work did not constitute political or social speech and could therefore be removed 
from display in a university corridor). 
 106. See Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 148 (3d Cir. 2013) (citing Brown v. 
Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2733 (2011)). 
 107. See Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 65 (1981). 
 108. Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Prods., 603 P.2d 454, 459 (Cal. 1979) (noting that 
the “line between the informing and the entertaining is too elusive” to warrant a distinction 
in the protection that each type of speech receives (quoting Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 
509, 510 (1948))). 
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likely that others would understand the message conveyed.109  In a right of 
publicity case, if the speech at issue is expressive, the court will likely find 
that the interest in free speech outweighs the right of publicity interest.110 
Commercial speech is “expression related solely to the economic 
interests of the speaker and its audience.”111  Critics note that the distinction 
between expressive and commercial speech makes little sense in the modern 
“commercial culture,” where commercial speech often contains expressive 
elements.112  Nonetheless, commercial speech generally receives lesser 
First Amendment protection than noncommercial speech113 because it has a 
“high potential for consumer deception and unjust enrichment.”114  
Commercial speech is protected by the First Amendment only if it is not 
misleading and concerns “lawful activity.”115  The government can 
constitutionally restrict commercial speech when the restriction is justified 
by a substantial state interest and when the restriction is narrowly tailored to 
serve that interest.116  In situations where commercial and noncommercial 
speech is “inextricably intertwined,” the speech is analyzed under the 
standard of review used for noncommercial speech.117  Commercial speech 
is often at issue in right of publicity cases,118 and generally the right of 
publicity will outweigh the First Amendment where speech is 
commercial.119 
 
 109. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 399 (1989) (holding that burning the American flag 
was a form of communication and therefore was “speech” protected by the First 
Amendment). 
 110. Tan, supra note 11, at 21; see also infra Part I.B.2. 
 111. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 561 (1980).  
Such speech “does no more than propose a commercial transaction.” Va. State Bd. of 
Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 776 (1976) (Stewart, J., 
concurring).  However, not all works sold for profit are considered commercial speech. See 
Simeonov v. Tiegs, 602 N.Y.S.2d 1014, 1017–18 (Civ. Ct. 1993). 
 112. David L. Hudson, Jr., Legal Almanac:  The First Amendment:  Freedom of Speech 
§ 6.9 (2012); see also White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1520 (9th Cir. 
1993) (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (“In our pop culture, where salesmanship must be 
entertaining and entertainment must sell, the line between the commercial and 
noncommercial has not merely blurred; it has disappeared.”). 
 113. Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.  Although the Supreme Court initially considered 
that commercial speech did not deserve any protection, see Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 
U.S. 52, 55 (1942), overruled by Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991).  The Court has 
since recognized the value of commercial speech. See City of Cincinnati v. Discovery 
Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 420 (1993). 
 114. Kwall, supra note 5, at 52. 
 115. Id. at 75 n.127. 
 116. Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 565–66. 
 117. See Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 796 (1988); see 
also Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180, 1185 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that 
any commercial aspect of the defendant’s product was “inextricably entwined” with 
expression and, therefore, was fully protected). 
 118. Tan, supra note 11, at 16 (noting that many right of publicity claims involve the 
unauthorized use of a celebrity in advertisements). 
 119. Id. at 21–22; see, e.g., Downing v. Abercrombie & Fitch, 265 F.3d 994, 1002 (9th 
Cir. 2001); White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1397–99 (9th Cir. 1992); 
Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 462–64 (9th Cir. 1988). 
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3.   How the Distinction Between Expressive and Commercial Speech 
Impacts the Right of Publicity Analysis 
The following two cases illustrate how the distinction between expressive 
and commercial speech affects the right of publicity analysis.  Both cases 
were brought under New York’s right to privacy statute.120  Although a 
right to privacy statute, it is sufficiently broad to encompass the right of 
publicity as well.121  New York’s privacy statutes prohibit the unauthorized 
use of another’s image for advertising and trade purposes.122  This 
limitation enables courts to balance First Amendment interests against 
government interests in restricting commercial speech.123  However, this 
limitation does not prohibit all profitable use of another’s image.  In 
Simeonov v. Tiegs,124 the court held that an artist could sell “at least a 
limited number of copies” of artwork that includes another’s likeness, 
without violating New York privacy law.125 
In Hoepker v. Kruger,126 plaintiff Thomas Hoepker, a German 
photographer, created a photographic image of plaintiff Charlotte Dabney in 
1960.127  Thirty years later, defendant Barbara Kruger created a collage of 
photographs that incorporated Hoepker’s 1960 piece of Charlotte 
Dabney.128  Krueger than sold this collage to the Museum of Contemporary 
Art Los Angeles.129  Hoepker and Dabney filed suit in the Southern District 
of New York, alleging violation of Dabney’s right to privacy.130 
Dabney’s claim satisfied three out of four elements for a right to privacy 
claim in New York:  (1) her image had been used, (2) without her consent, 
(3) in New York State.131  Therefore, the court set out to determine whether 
the fourth element, that this use was “for advertising purposes or for the 
purposes of trade,” had been satisfied.132  The court found that “advertising 
that is undertaken in connection with a use protected by the First 
Amendment falls outside the statute’s reach.”133  Thus, because the Kruger 
 
 120. New York has codified the right to privacy. N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50–51 
(McKinney 1995). 
 121. Pesce, supra note 79, at 782.  By passing these statutes, the legislature sought to 
“protect against the commercial appropriation of a plaintiff’s name or likeness.” Foster v. 
Svenson, No. 651826/2013, 2013 WL 3989038, at *1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 5, 2013). 
 122. See N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50–51; see also Hoepker v. Kruger, 200 F. Supp. 2d 
340, 348 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). 
 123. Kruger, 200 F. Supp. 2d at 348 (noting that “[t]he advertising and trade limitation in 
New York’s privacy statutes was crafted with the First Amendment in mind.”). 
 124. 602 N.Y.S.2d 1014 (Civ. Ct. 1993). 
 125. Id. at 1018. 
 126. 200 F. Supp. 2d 340 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). 
 127. Id. at 342. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. at 344. 
 131. Id. at 348. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. at 350. 
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composite was protected artistic expression, it outweighed Dabney’s right 
to privacy.134 
The New York Supreme Court reached the same conclusion years later in 
Foster v. Svenson.135  During the course of a year, photographer Arne 
Svenson photographed strangers inside their apartments.136  He displayed 
these photographs, titled “The Neighbors,” in an exhibit at a New York 
gallery.137  Svenson did not have consent to photograph any of the people 
portrayed in “The Neighbors” or to display the photographs.138 
Plaintiffs, the parents of two young children who had appeared in 
Svenson’s photographs, filed suit pursuant to New York Civil Rights Law 
sections 50 to 51.139  One of the photographs portrayed a “clearly 
identifiable” image of one child’s face.140  The plaintiffs claimed that these 
photographs had exposed the location of their apartment, which 
compromised “the security and safety of the[ir] children.”141 
The court noted that an artistic work that uses another’s image is not 
simply “advertising or trade,” but is protected speech, which may be sold as 
part of “the right to disseminate the ‘speech.’”142  Thus, the court rejected 
the plaintiffs’ contention that because Svenson had used the photos in the 
media to promote his exhibition and had offered these works for sale, his 
actions constituted “advertising and trade” under New York Civil Rights 
Law sections 50 to 51.143  The court concluded that Svenson’s photographs 
served “more than just an advertising or trade purpose because they 
promote the enjoyment of art in the form of a displayed exhibition.”144 
Noting that “it makes Plaintiffs cringe to think their private lives and 
images of their small children can find their way into the public forum of an 
art exhibition,” the court nonetheless concluded that the “value of artistic 
expression” of Svenson’s photographs outweighed any commercial value 
“that stem[ed] from the published photos”.145  Thus, the court held in favor 
 
 134. Id.  However, the court noted that First Amendment rights do not completely negate 
privacy rights. Id. at 348. 
 135. No. 651826/2013, 2013 WL 3989038, at *1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 5, 2013). 
 136. Id. 
 137. See Dan Arnheim, Right to Privacy v. Freedom of Expression in Case of “Peeping 
Tom” Photographer, CTR. FOR ART LAW (July 21, 2013), http://itsartlaw.com/2013/07/21/ 
right-to-privacy-v-freedom-of-expression-in-case-of-peeping-tom-photographer/. 
 138. Foster, 2013 WL 3989038, at *1.  In fact, Svenson admitted:  “The Neighbors don’t 
know they are being photographed; I carefully shoot from the shadows of my home into 
theirs.” Id. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id.  In their complaint, plaintiffs stated that they were “greatly frightened and 
angered by defendant’s utter disregard for their privacy and the privacy of their 
children . . . [and] now fear that they must keep their shades drawn at all hours of the day in 
order to avoid telephoto photography by a neighbor.” Adam Klasfeld, Parents Blast 
Photographer for Telephoto Shots, COURTHOUSE NEWS SERVICE (May 24, 2013, 9:15 AM), 
https://www.courthousenews.com/2013/05/24/57929.htm. 
 142. Foster, 2013 WL 3989038, at *1. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. 
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of Svenson, finding that the right to privacy yields to the First 
Amendment.146 
In Hoepker and Foster, each court found that the First Amendment 
interests outweighed the right to privacy interests only after determining 
that the speech at hand was expressive rather than commercial.147  Such a 
determination is unnecessary in cases where the speech is part of news 
coverage, and therefore automatically shielded from right of publicity 
claims.  The following section addresses this category of protected speech. 
4.   The Newsworthiness Doctrine:  
Speech Shielded from Right of Publicity Claims 
Under the newsworthiness doctrine, the media may use the unauthorized 
image of celebrities in its “everyday news coverage.”148  “News coverage” 
has been construed broadly to include “virtually all types of information 
and entertainment communicated by the media.”149  Courts read the 
newsworthiness doctrine broadly because they believe “it is not the place of 
courts to determine which issues may or may not interest the general 
public.”150  Over half of the states that have right of publicity statutes 
include an express media exception.151 
While the newsworthiness doctrine gives the media broad leeway in 
using celebrities’ images,152 non-media defendants are generally not 
exempt from liability for the unauthorized use of celebrity identities even if 
this use has some “newsworthy content.”153  Additionally, the 
newsworthiness doctrine has two significant limitations for media 
defendants.  First, the newsworthiness doctrine does not protect publishers 
who use another’s identity only to “draw attention to an unrelated 
article.”154  Second, where news coverage “destroys the total economic 
 
 146. Id.  This decision likely shocked many, because Svenson’s work was greeted with 
outrage by many New Yorkers. See David Walker, Judge Dismisses Privacy Lawsuit Against 
“Voyeur” Artist Arne Svenson, PHOTO DISTRICT NEWS (Aug. 6, 2013), 
http://www.pdnonline.com/news/Judge-Dismisses-Priv-8708.shtml. 
 147. See supra notes 132, 143 and accompanying text. 
 148. Patrick Whitman, Everyone’s a Critic:  Tiger Woods, the Right of Publicity and the 
Artist, 1 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 41, 57 (2001).  The doctrine is not limited to current events 
but rather also applies to any story that is “accurate and deals with a matter of public 
interest.” Ausness, supra note 59, at 1030. 
 149. Tan, supra note 11, at 22. Thus, parodies and satires are protected. See J. Thomas 
McCarthy, The Spring 1995 Horace S. Manges Lecture—The Human Persona as 
Commercial Property:  The Right of Publicity, 19 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 129, 131 
(1995). 
 150. Ausness, supra note 59, at 1030. 
 151. MCCARTHY, supra note 24, § 6.18. 
 152. See Ausness, supra note 59, at 1030; see also Tan, supra note 11, at 22 (noting that 
there is a “strong presumption in favor of the media,” and a “media defendant who invokes 
the newsworthiness exception often escapes liability”). 
 153. See Tan, supra note 11, at 22–23. 
 154. Ausness, supra note 59, at 1031; Whitman, supra note 144, at 60; see also Grant v. 
Esquire, Inc., 367 F. Supp 876, 885 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (finding a violation of the plaintiff’s 
right of publicity because the use of the plaintiff’s picture was unrelated to the content of 
defendant’s article). 
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viability of a performer’s act,” the court limits its protection of the 
media.155 
II.   THE COURTS TRY TO RESOLVE THE TENSION BETWEEN 
THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
This part explains the current approaches that the courts use to reconcile 
free speech and the right of publicity.  Part II.A explains the only Supreme 
Court case to address the conflict, Zacchini v. Howard-Scripps 
Broadcasting Co.156  Part II.B explores the four approaches that courts have 
developed in response to the Supreme Court’s unclear holding of how the 
conflicting interests of the right of publicity and the First Amendment 
should be balanced.  The Sixth and Second Circuits have adopted the 
relatedness test, which looks to the relationship between the use of a 
celebrity’s likeness and the work as a whole.157  The Missouri Supreme 
Court has adopted the predominant purpose test under which works that are 
predominantly commercial violate the right of publicity, while works that 
are predominantly expressive do not.158  The Third Circuit and the 
California Supreme Court have adopted the transformative use test, which 
asks whether a work depicting a celebrity is artistic expression rather than a 
literal depiction of the celebrity.159  Finally, the Eighth and Tenth Circuits 
use an ad-hoc balancing test that weighs the policy justifications for the 
right of publicity against the content creator’s First Amendment interests.160 
In ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publishing Inc., the Sixth Circuit used two tests—
the transformative use test and the ad-hoc balancing test—to decide a case 
that involved a clash between the right of publicity and the First 
Amendment.161  Part II.C summarizes this approach, and then Part III 
evaluates it in greater detail. 
A.   The Supreme Court Creates an Unclear Standard 
The Supreme Court has addressed the conflicting interests of the First 
Amendment and the right of publicity only once, in Zacchini v. Scripps-
Howard Broadcasting Co.162  Zacchini was an entertainer who performed a 
“human cannonball” act in which he was shot out of a cannon at the Geauga 
 
 155. Whitman, supra note 148, at 57. 
 156. 433 U.S. 562 (1977). 
 157. See Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 461 (6th Cir. 2003); Rogers v. Grimaldi, 
875 F.2d 994, 1004 (2d Cir. 1989). 
 158. Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363, 374 (Mo. 2003). 
 159. See Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 163 (3d Cir. 2013); Winter v. DC Comics, 
69 P.3d 473, 475 (Cal. 2003); Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 
807 (Cal. 2001); No Doubt v. Activision Publ’g, Inc., 122 Cal. Rptr. 3d 397, 400–01 (Ct. 
App. 2011). 
 160. C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg., Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media, L.P., 505 
F.3d 818, 823–24 (8th Cir. 2007); Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 
95 F.3d 959, 972 (10th Cir. 1996). 
 161. See ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 936 (6th Cir. 2003). 
 162. 433 U.S. 562 (1977). 
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County Fair in Burton, Ohio.163  On August 31, 1972, a reporter for 
Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co. videotaped Zacchini’s entire act, which 
lasted approximately fifteen seconds, and aired the clip on a news 
program.164  Zacchini brought a suit in Ohio State court, claiming that 
Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co. unlawfully appropriated his professional 
property when it publicized his act without his consent.165  On certiorari, 
the U.S. Supreme Court sought to answer whether First and Fourteenth 
Amendment rights permitted Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co. to infringe 
upon Zacchini’s right of publicity.166 
1.   The Majority Opinion in Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co. 
The Court held that the First Amendment did not permit the station to 
broadcast the entire performance.167  The Ohio Supreme Court had ruled 
that Scripps-Howard was “constitutionally privileged to include in its 
newscasts matters of public interest that would otherwise be protected by 
the right of publicity.”168  The court had relied heavily on Time, Inc. v. 
Hill169 to reach this conclusion.170 
The Supreme Court distinguished the case before it from Time, Inc. on 
two grounds.  First, the Court explained that in Time, Inc. the Court had 
addressed a “false light” case rather than a case involving “appropriation” 
of another’s identity for commercial purposes.171  Thus, Time, Inc. did not 
involve the rights of a performer whose name had a commercial value.172  
Second, the Court distinguished the State’s interests in allowing a cause of 
action in each case.173  The State’s interests in Time, Inc. was to protect the 
plaintiff’s reputation.174  The State’s interest in permitting a right of 
publicity is in “the right of the individual to reap the reward of his 
endeavors.”175 
Therefore, Scripps-Howard was not privileged to broadcast Zacchini’s 
entire performance, because this posed “a substantial threat to the economic 
value of [his] performance.”176  Zacchini earned a living through his 
 
 163. Id. at 563.  To watch this extraordinary feat, see Ray Zate, Zacchini:  Human 
Cannonball (Official Trailer), YOUTUBE (Aug. 7, 2013), http://www.youtube.com/ 
watch?v=HSizGn8vbFQ. 
 164. Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 563–64. 
 165. Id. at 564. 
 166. Id. at 565–66. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. at 569. 
 169. 385 U.S. 374 (1967). 
 170. Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 570–71.  Time, Inc. held that the media has the privilege to 
report matters of public interest, even if such reporting infringes upon privacy rights of those 
portrayed. See Time, Inc., 385 U.S. at 388. 
 171. Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 573. 
 172. See id. at 574 (noting that Time, Inc. did not involve the broadcast of a performer’s 
entire act for which he normally gets paid). 
 173. See id. at 573. 
 174. See id. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. at 575. 
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performance, and the broadcast of the entire performance for free dissuaded 
the public from going to the fair and paying to see the performance.177  
Thus, if Scripps-Howard broadcasted his entire performance, it was 
required to recognize Zacchini’s “commercial stake in his act,” and pay 
him.178 
Recognizing that individuals have an “economic incentive . . . to produce 
a performance of interest to the public,” the Court considered that 
protecting performers’ economic rights would increase the level of 
entertainment available to the public, and thereby advance First 
Amendment goals.179 
2.   The Dissenting Opinion in 
Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co. 
Justice Powell, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, dissented 
primarily because they were concerned with the majority’s focus on the 
broadcast of the “entire act.”180  Justice Powell noted that the majority’s 
“repeated incantation of a single formula:  ‘a performer’s act’” did not 
provide a clear standard.181  Moreover, Justice Powell considered the 
majority’s opinion insensitive to First Amendment interests, noting that the 
broadcast by Scripps-Howard was a “routine example of the press’ 
fulfilling the informing function so vital to our system.”182  He explained 
that the majority’s holding could lead to “media self-censorship;” unsure of 
what portrays an “entire act,” broadcasting stations may decline to cover 
even “clearly newsworthy events.”183  In this case, the public is deprived of 
the values that the First Amendment fosters.184 
The dissent proposed a different analytical framework from the one 
employed by the majority.185  Rather than looking to whether Zacchini’s 
entire act had been broadcasted, the question should be how Scripps-
Howard had used the film footage.186  Under this framework, a news 
broadcast is protected unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the news 
broadcast was a “subterfuge or cover for private or commercial 
exploitation.”187  Because a plaintiff like Zacchini had made himself public 
through his performance, it would be inconsistent with the principles of the 
First Amendment for him to recover for “routine” news coverage.188 
 
 177. Id. at 575–76. 
 178. Id. at 578. 
 179. Id. at 575–76; see also Ausness, supra note 59, at 1035. 
 180. Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 580–81 (Powell, J., dissenting); see also Samuelson, supra 
note 8, at 854. 
 181. Zacchini, 433 U.S at 580–81; see also Ausness, supra note 59, at 1035 (noting that 
the “entire act” standard does not provide guidance about the extent to which the First 
Amendment protects against the appropriation of something less than an entire act). 
 182. Zacchini, 433 U.S at 579–80. 
 183. Id. at 580–81. 
 184. Id. at 581. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. 
926 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83 
While this “routine news” test has been less criticized than the majority 
opinion, it too creates uncertainty.189  Distinguishing between routine news 
and commercial entertainment, as Justice Powell proposed, is difficult 
because many news shows have both commercial and entertainment 
components.190 
3.   What Did Zacchini Establish? 
Zacchini demonstrates that the right of publicity can outweigh First 
Amendment interests.191  However, the majority focused on the narrow 
situation of when a television company has broadcasted a performer’s entire 
act, rather than on the broader question of when the use of one’s name or 
likeness violates his publicity rights.192  Thus, no general rule can be clearly 
derived from Zacchini to resolve the conflict between the First Amendment 
and the right of publicity.193 
Unpredictability has always been considered especially detrimental when 
free speech is at issue.194  Many exercises of the First Amendment include 
portrayals of celebrities as part of movies, television shows, and plays.195  
However, the threat of liability due to a finding that such works have 
infringed on a celebrity’s right of publicity may deter production of such 
works.196  This is especially true if those who have produced the works do 
not have insurance against sanctions because “of the uncertainty of the 
prevailing legal rules.”197 
Additionally, overprotecting the right of publicity may create “a 
monopoly over the raw material of creative expression.”198  On the other 
hand, under-protecting the right of publicity may reduce incentives for 
celebrities to engage in creative endeavors.199 
Since Zacchini, the Supreme Court has denied numerous writs of 
certiorari asking the Court to create a uniform standard for balancing the 
right of publicity against the First Amendment.200  Without guidance from 
 
 189. Ausness, supra note 59, at 1035; see also Haines, supra note 7, at 229. 
 190. Ausness, supra note 59, at 1035. 
 191. See Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 167 (3d Cir. 2013). 
 192. Volokh, supra note 20, at 906. 
 193. See McCarthy, supra note 24, § 8.27; see also Tan, supra note 11, at 19 (noting that 
Zacchini is of “limited precedential value”). 
 194. Felcher & Rubin, supra note 21, at 1594 (“First Amendment rights require 
‘breathing space,’ and uncertainty about the legal standards that control these rights is 
regarded as having a ‘chilling effect’ on freedom of expression.”). 
 195. Id. at 1595. 
 196. Id. 
 197. Id. 
 198. See Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959, 976 (10th 
Cir. 1996). 
 199. See id. 
 200. See, e.g., C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg., Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media, 
L.P., 505 F.3d 818, 820 (8th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 533 U.S. 1090 (2008); Comedy III 
Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797 (Cal. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1078 
(2002); Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 208 F.3d 885 (10th Cir. 
2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 873 (2000). 
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the Supreme Court, the lower courts have created various tests for 
addressing the tension between the First Amendment and the right of 
publicity. 
B.   Four Tests Emerge in Response to Zacchini 
In line with the doctrine of constitutional avoidance,201 many courts 
facing a conflict between the First Amendment and publicity rights interpret 
the right of publicity narrowly so as to avoid the constitutional question 
regarding the First Amendment.202  However, the conflict cannot always be 
avoided.  Therefore, the lower courts have created four tests in an attempt to 
strike a balance between the competing interests in right of publicity cases:  
the relatedness test, the predominant purpose test, the transformative use 
test, and the ad-hoc balancing test.203  This section describes all four tests; 
however, particular emphasis is placed on the transformative use test and 
the ad-hoc balancing test because these shape the test proposed in Part III of 
this Note. 
1.   The Relatedness Test 
The relatedness test, which originated in Rogers v. Grimaldi,204 asks 
whether the use of the celebrity’s likeness is related to the work as a 
whole.205  In Rogers, the appellees produced a film entitled “Ginger and 
Fred.”206  The film portrayed two fictional Italian cabaret performers who 
had built a career in Italy by imitating the famous Hollywood duo, Ginger 
Rogers and Fred Astaire.207  Rogers alleged that the defendant’s use of her 
first name in the title of the film confused consumers, in violation of the 
Lanham Act,208 and violated her common law right of publicity.209 
The Second Circuit used the same test to address the Lanham Act claim 
and the right of publicity claim.210  Although the right of publicity is 
broader than the Lanham Act,211 both laws serve similar interests.  While 
the right of publicity protects against the unauthorized use of a celebrity’s 
 
 201. See NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 440 U.S. 490, 508–09 (1979). 
 202. McCarthy, supra note 24, § 8.36; see also Valentine v. C.B.S., Inc., 698 F.2d 430, 
433 (11th Cir. 1983) (holding that a statute which prohibited the use of a person’s name 
without their consent should be construed to avoid any constitutional issues); Simeonov v. 
Tiegs, 602 N.Y.S.2d 1014, 1018 (Civ. Ct. 1993) (“If a Court can avoid declaring a provision 
of law unconstitutional, it must do so.”). 
 203. “[C]ourts have gradually constructed” a “careful balance . . . between the right of 
publicity and the First Amendment.” Landham v. Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc., 227 F.3d 619, 
626 (6th Cir. 2000). 
 204. 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989). 
 205. See id. at 1004–05. 
 206. Id. at 996. 
 207. Id. at 997. 
 208. Trademark (Lanham) Act of 1946, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2012). The Lanham Act 
protects the public from commercial deception. See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 
505 U.S. 763, 767–68 (1992). 
 209. Rogers, 875 F.2d at 997. 
 210. Id. at 999–1002. 
 211. Id. at 1004. 
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image,212 the Lanham Act protects against the use of a celebrity’s image in 
a way that falsely implies the celebrity’s endorsement of a certain 
product.213  Therefore, courts have observed that the “Lanham Act is the 
federal equivalent of a right of publicity claim.”214 
The Second Circuit rejected Rogers’s argument that the First Amendment 
only protects the author if he has no alternative means to express his 
idea.215  Noting that the Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner “alternative avenues of 
communication” test216 had been applied in trademark cases,217 the panel 
rejected this test because it “does not sufficiently accommodate the public’s 
interest in free expression.”218 
Instead, the court looked to three cases that had addressed the use of a 
celebrity’s name in a fictional or semi-fictional book or movie title.219  
Based on these cases, the court held that because the movie title “Ginger 
and Fred” was related to the contents of the movie (the main characters 
were in fact known as Ginger and Fred in Italy) and was not “a disguised 
 
 212. See MCCARTHY supra note 24, § 1.3. 
 213. See, e.g., White v. Samsung Elec. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1399–1400 (9th Cir. 
1992). 
 214. Kirby v. Sega of Am., Inc., 50 Cal. Rptr. 3d 607, 614 (Ct. App. 2006); see also ETW 
Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 937 (6th Cir. 2003). 
 215. Rogers, 875 F.2d at 998–99.  This argument was based on Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 
where the Supreme Court determined whether a privately owned shopping center could 
prohibit others from distributing handbills, which were unrelated to the center’s business, on 
its property. 407 U.S. 551, 552 (1972).  The Court noted that the respondents had alternative 
methods of delivering their handbills, outside of the shopping complex. Id. at 566–67.  Thus, 
the Court concluded:  “It would be an unwarranted infringement of property rights to require 
them to yield to the exercise of First Amendment rights under circumstances where adequate 
alternative avenues of communication exist.  Such an accommodation would diminish 
property rights without significantly enhancing the asserted right of free speech.” Id. at 567. 
 216. See Lloyd Corp., 407 U.S. at 567. 
 217. See Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 836 F.2d 397, 402–03 (8th Cir. 1987) 
(holding that because defendants could convey their message without infringing the 
plaintiff’s trademark, in other words, there existed an “adequate alternative avenue[] of 
communication,” and they were not protected under the First Amendment); see also Dallas 
Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 206 (2d Cir. 1979) 
(same). 
 218. Rogers, 875 F.2d at 999.  The court addressed the Lloyd test in its analysis of 
Rogers’s trademark infringement claim; however, the argument that it does not 
accommodate the public’s interest in free expression was applied to the right of publicity in 
Cardtoons, L.C. v. MLB Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959, 971 (10th Cir. 1996). See also infra 
notes 309–10 and accompanying text. 
 219. Rogers, 875 F.2d at 1004. In Hicks v. Casablanca Records, the court found no right 
of publicity claim where it was obvious to the public that an event depicted in a movie was 
fictional. 464 F. Supp. 426, 433 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).  In Frosch v. Grosset & Dunlap, Inc., New 
York’s appellate division said that the right of publicity did not prohibit the use of a 
celebrity’s name in a title as long as the work was not “simply a disguised commercial 
advertisement for the sale of goods or services.” 427 N.Y.S.2d 828, 829 (App. Div. 1980).  
In Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Productions, Justice Newmann noted that free expression 
would be significantly reduced if authors could not write fictional stories depicting 
prominent individuals, and thus concluded that the use of a celebrity’s name would not 
infringe on the celebrity’s right of publicity as long as the use was not “wholly unrelated” to 
the celebrity. 603 P.2d 454, 457 n.6 (Cal. 1979) (Newman, J., concurring). 
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advertisement” for the sale of a product or service, it did not violate the 
Oregon common law right of publicity.220 
The Sixth Circuit adopted the Rogers approach in Parks v. LaFace 
Records.221  In Parks, Rosa Parks, an international symbol of the civil 
rights movement,222 sued record producers LaFace Records and the rap duo 
OutKast, alleging that the musicians had violated her right of publicity with 
their hit single song titled “Rosa Parks.”223 
Noting that the Third Restatement of the Unfair Competition supports the 
Rogers formulation,224 the court applied Rogers to determine “the artistic 
relevance of the title, Rosa Parks, to the content of the song.”225  
Accordingly, it looked to the song lyrics, specifically, “Ah ha, hush that 
fuss.  Everybody move to the back of the bus.”226  Although OutKast’s 
song was not about Rosa Parks “in a strictly biographical sense,” and 
OutKast admitted that they had never intended the song to be about Rosa 
Parks, OutKast’s use of her name and the phrase “move to the back of the 
bus” could be considered a reference to Rosa Parks.227  Thus, the court 
found that the title of the song was not ‘wholly unrelated’ to the content of 
the song and precluded summary judgment on OutKast’s First Amendment 
defense.228 
The relatedness test has been criticized because it was created in response 
to a claim under the Lanham Act.229  The right of publicity is broader than 
trademark law, and therefore any right of publicity test should have a 
broader scope than a trademark law test.230  Additionally, because the 
analysis focused entirely on the title of a work, the Rogers concurrence 
cautioned that the “unique case” would be an “inappropriate vehicle for 
fashioning a general rule.”231  Finally, the relatedness test has been 
criticized because it has been applied inconsistently.232  While the Sixth 
Circuit used the relatedness test to resolve a right of publicity issue in Parks 
v. LaFace Records, just a few months later, in ETW Corp. v. Jireh 
 
 220. Rogers, 875 F.2d at 1002. 
 221. 329 F.3d 437 (6th Cir. 2003). 
 222. Id. at 442. 
 223. Id. 
 224. Id. at 461 (“Use of another’s identity in a novel, play, or motion picture is . . . not 
ordinarily an infringement [of the right of publicity, unless] the name or likeness is used 
solely to attract attention to a work that is not related to the identified person.” (citing 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 47 cmt. c (1995)). 
 225. Id. at 442. 
 226. Id. 
 227. Id. at 452–53. 
 228. Id. at 461. 
 229. See Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 157 (3d Cir. 2013). 
 230. Id. (noting that the relatedness test “is a blunt instrument, unfit for widespread 
application in cases that require a carefully calibrated balancing of two fundamental 
protections:  the right of free expression and the right to control, manage, and profit from 
one’s own identity”). 
 231. Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 1006 (2d Cir. 1989) (Griesa, J., concurring). 
 232. See Hart, 717 F.3d at 156. 
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Publishing Inc., it declared that the relatedness test is not applicable to right 
of publicity claims.233 
2.   The Predominant Purpose Test 
Under the predominant purpose test adopted in Doe v. TCI 
Cablevision,234 an unauthorized use of an individual’s identity violates the 
individual’s right of publicity only if the use is “predominantly 
commercial,” while a “predominantly expressive” use of the individual’s 
identity does not violate his or her right of publicity.235  Noting that right of 
publicity cases focus on whether the use of a person’s identity is 
“expressive” or “commercial,”236 the Missouri Supreme Court considered 
that the relatedness test and the transformative use test did not give 
sufficient thought to the fact that many uses of a person’s identity could 
have both expressive and commercial elements.237 
Therefore, the court applied the predominant purpose test,238 finding that 
it “better addresses the cases where speech is both expressive and 
commercial.”239  Under this test, a work that “predominantly exploits the 
commercial value of an individual’s identity” violates the individual’s right 
of identity even if the work has some expressive components.240  On the 
other hand, a work whose purpose is predominantly expressive should 
receive First Amendment protection in a right of publicity claim.241 
With this framework, the court analyzed Anthony “Tony” Twist’s right 
of publicity claim against Todd McFarlane Productions, Inc.242  Plaintiff, 
Tony Twist, was a hockey player who played for the Quebec Nordiques, 
and who was known for his “tough-guy ‘enforcer’” persona.243  In 1992, 
McFarlane created a comic book that included a “tough-guy ‘enforcer’” 
character name Anthony “Tony Twist” Twistelli.244  In 1994, in a response 
to fan questions, McFarlane admitted that the comic book character Tony 
Twist was the name of a hockey player for the Quebec Nordiques.245 
 
 233. See ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 936 (6th Cir. 2003). 
 234. 110 S.W.3d 363 (Mo. 2003). 
 235. Id. at 374. 
 236. Id. at 373 (noting that while use of a person’s likeness in news and creative works is 
expressive speech, and therefore fully protected, use of a person’s likeness for “purely 
commercial purposes” is commercial speech and generally not protected). 
 237. Id. at 373–74 (noting that the relatedness test and the transformative use test do not 
actually balance the right of publicity and First Amendment interests but instead 
automatically grant First Amendment protection to works that are expressive and deny 
protection to works that are commercial). 
 238. This test was initially proposed by intellectual property litigator, Mark Lee. See 
Mark Lee, Agents of Chaos:  Judicial Confusion in Defining the Right of Publicity-Free 
Speech Interface, 23 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 471, 500–01 (2003). 
 239. Doe, 110 S.W.3d at 374. 
 240. Lee, supra note 233, at 500. 
 241. Id. 
 242. Doe, 110 S.W.3d at 366. 
 243. Id. 
 244. Id. 
 245. Id. 
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The court found that the defendants had used Twist’s identity for 
commercial gain, yet there was also an expressive element to the use of his 
name “as a metaphorical reference to tough-guy ‘enforcers.’”246  
Comparing the commercial and expressive components of the comic book 
character, the court found that the use of Twist’s name did not serve as an 
“artistic or literary expression,” but instead had become “predominantly a 
ploy” to sell merchandise.247  Thus, Tony Twist’s right of publicity trumped 
McFarlane’s free speech rights.248 
Jurisdictions outside of Missouri have not adopted the predominant 
purpose test.249  Critics note that the test does not balance free speech and 
right of publicity values.250  Instead, the test requires judges to look to 
artists’ motivations in creating works.251  This inquiry does not offer an 
accurate analysis of the value of the art; artists are often motivated by profit, 
yet this does not reduce the expressive value of their works.252  
Additionally, the test does not provide guidelines for determining when a 
work is “predominantly expressive.”253 
3.   The Transformative Use Test 
Under the transformative use test, a work depicting a celebrity does not 
infringe on the celebrity’s right of publicity if it is the artist’s creative 
expression rather than a literal depiction of the celebrity.254  This test was 
developed in Comedy III Productions, Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc.,255 where 
Comedy III Productions, Inc., the registered owner to a comedy act known 
as the Three Stooges, brought suit against Saderup, an artist who 
specialized in charcoal drawings of celebrities.256  Saderup’s drawings were 
used to create lithographic prints on T-shirts.257  Without obtaining Comedy 
III’s permission, Saderup sold lithographs and T-shirts bearing an image of 
The Three Stooges.258  
The California Court of Appeal ruled in favor of Comedy III, concluding 
that Saderup’s works did not receive First Amendment protection because 
“they were reproductions rather than original works of art.”259  On appeal, 
the Supreme Court of California noted that reproductions are also entitled to 
 
 246. Id. at 374. 
 247. Id. 
 248. Id. 
 249. Tan, supra note 11, at 29.  The Third Circuit has called the test “subjective at best, 
[and] arbitrary at worst.”  Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 154 (3d Cir. 2013). 
 250. See Tan, supra note 11, at 29–30; see also Michael S. Kruse, Missouri’s Interfacing 
of the First Amendment and the Right of Publicity:  Is the “Predominant Purpose” Test 
Really That Desirable?, 69 MO. L. REV. 799, 816 (2004). 
 251. See Kruse, supra note 245, at 815–16. 
 252. Id. 
 253. Tan, supra note 11, at 30. 
 254. Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 809 (Cal. 2001). 
 255. 21 P.3d 797 (Cal. 2001). 
 256. Id. at 800–01. 
 257. Id. at 800. 
 258. Id. at 800–01. 
 259. Id. at 799. 
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First Amendment protection and chose to resolve the issue by analyzing the 
works themselves.260 
The court drew on the “fair use” analysis from copyright law and looked 
to “the purpose and character of use” of works which threatened one’s right 
of publicity.261  The purpose of looking into this fair use factor was to 
determine whether a new work is “transformative.”262  Thus, the court held 
that the balance between the right of publicity and the First Amendment 
turns on “whether a product containing a celebrity’s likeness is so 
transformed that it has become primarily the defendant’s own expression 
rather than the celebrity’s likeness.”263  The First Amendment protects 
works with transformative elements—that is, works that “add[] something 
new, with a further purpose or different character, altering the first [work] 
with new expression, meaning, or message.”264 
To determine whether a work is transformative, courts may consider 
whether the value of the work derives “primarily from the fame of the 
celebrity depicted.”265  If the value of the work comes not from the depicted 
celebrity’s fame but rather from “the creativity, skill, and reputation of the 
artist,” the work is likely sufficiently transformative.266 
Based on the transformative use test, the court concluded that the right of 
publicity outweighed Saderup’s First Amendment rights.267  The court 
compared Saderup’s works to Andy Warhol’s silkscreens, which depicted 
images of Marilyn Monroe, Elizabeth Taylor, and Elvis Presley.268  It 
observed that while Warhol distorted the celebrities’ images to convey a 
“social comment on the dehumanization of celebrity itself,” Saderup’s goal 
was to create “literal, conventional depictions of the Three Stooges so as to 
exploit their fame.”269  The court considered that protecting Saderup’s 
works would eviscerate the right of publicity entirely because celebrities 
would no longer have sole control over the use of their images.270 
 
 260. Id. 
 261. Id. at 808.  The court looked to copyright law because both laws are similar in that 
they encourage creativity by incentivizing entertainers with personal profit. See Ausness, 
supra note 59, at 989. 
 262. Comedy III, 21 P.3d at 809. 
 263. Id. 
 264. Id. at 808. Transformative elements include parody, factual reporting, fictionalized 
portrayal, heavy-handed lampooning, and subtle social criticism. Id. at 809. 
 265. Id. at 810. 
 266. Id. 
 267. Id. at 799. 
 268. Id. at 811. 
 269. Id. But see Winter v. DC Comics, 69 P.3d 473, 476 (Cal. 2003) (holding that a comic 
book featuring “half-worm, half-human” creatures had sufficiently transformed the 
plaintiffs’ likeness and, thus, was protected by the First Amendment).  In between the 
Comedy III and Winter spectrum is Kirby v. Sega of America, Inc., in which the California 
Court of Appeal found a video game character sufficiently transformed because although the 
character was “reminiscent” of the plaintiff, there were significant differences between the 
plaintiff’s traits and those of the character. 50 Cal. Rptr. 3d 607, 613 (Ct. App. 2006). 
 270. Comedy III, 21 P.3d at 811. 
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a.   Critiques of the Transformative Use Test 
Scholars have noted three significant flaws with the transformative use 
test.  First, the transformative use test stems from the fair use doctrine in 
copyright law, which is “murky and unpredictable.”271  Second, the 
definition of a “transformative” work is unclear.272  Third, the test places 
the judiciary in the position of art critic rather than judge, when deciding 
whether a work is transformative.273 
Because the transformative use test has created uncertainty in fair use 
analysis,274 scholars criticize its expansion to right of publicity cases.275  
When applied to copyright cases, the transformative use test furthers the 
goal of copyright law, which is to “encourage the production of new 
expressive works.”276  Yet, in the right of publicity context, the 
transformative use test has the opposite effect by limiting new expressive 
creations unless they are “transformative in the right of publicity sense.”277  
For example, while Saderup’s drawing in Comedy III deserved copyright 
protection because it reflected original creation by depicting the Three 
Stooges realistically, it violated the right of publicity.278 
Additionally, Comedy III did not create a clear definition of what 
constitutes a transformative use.279  The Comedy III court defined 
“transformative” use in three distinct ways.  A transformative work is one 
which:  (1) “contribut[es] something more than a ‘merely trivial’ variation,” 
(2) uses the celebrity’s likeness as only “one of the ‘raw materials’” to 
create an original work, and (3) alters the “expression, meaning, or 
message” of the celebrity’s images.280  These three definitions can be 
difficult to reconcile.281  A work can satisfy the first two definitions without 
necessarily altering the “expression, meaning, or message” of the 
celebrity’s image.282  Therefore, it can be difficult to determine what is 
 
 271. Dougherty, supra note 20, at 28.  The phrase “transformative use” was first used in 
fair use cases in copyright law. See supra Part II.B.3.  In a 1990 Harvard Law Review 
article, Judge Pierre Leval of the Second Circuit first explained that under the “purpose and 
character [test]” of the fair use doctrine, a work could be copied so long as that work was 
“transformative.” See Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 
1105, 1111 (1990).  Just four years later, in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., the Supreme 
Court defined transformative use as “altering the first with new expression, meaning, or 
message.” 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994).  The Court emphasized that a “transformative use” is 
central for a finding of fair use. Id. 
 272. See Dougherty, supra note 20, at 29. 
 273. See id. at 70. 
 274. Id. at 32; Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, The More Things Change the Less They 
Seem “Transformed”:  Some Reflections on Fair Use, 46 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 251, 
254 (1998). 
 275. See Volokh, supra note 20, at 922; see also Dougherty, supra note 20, at 28. 
 276. Dougherty, supra note 20, at 32 (noting that the transformative use test requires 
works to “incorporate new expression”). 
 277. Id. 
 278. See id. 
 279. Volokh, supra note 20, at 916. 
 280. Id. at 916–17. 
 281. See id. at 917. 
 282. Id. 
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transformative.283  As a result, the transformative use test has yielded 
inconsistent results.  For instance, courts have reached opposing decisions 
due to different understandings of what must be “transformed” in order for 
a work to pass the transformative use test; it is unclear whether a work is 
“transformative” if the celebrity’s image has been transformed or if the 
work as a whole has transformative elements.284  Moreover, an unclear 
definition leaves artists confused about what sort of works they can and 
cannot create, which in turn may limit the types of art produced.285 
Finally, the test allows too much subjectivity in judgment.286  The test 
requires judges to act as art critics, which is a “dangerous undertaking” for 
which they are unprepared.287  Critics of the test question “whether society 
would benefit from judicial art critics deciding which art adds to societal 
commentary and which art does not.”288  When judges are influenced by 
their aesthetic preferences in their decisions, there is a risk that they will 
shape the art created in the future.289  To guarantee protection of their 
artwork, artists may begin shaping their art to “meet the aesthetic 
preferences of judges.”290 
However, considering that the transformative use test is applied in cases 
involving artistic creations, some commentators have noted that subjectivity 
is inevitable, and not entirely undesirable.291  Given varying artistic tastes 
and preferences, judging artistic creations “objectively” is nearly 
impossible.  Therefore, “instead of hiding behind a bright line rule with an 
illusory promise of objectivity,” the transformative use test acknowledges 
the minimal subjectivity inherent in its application.292  Additionally, the 
Comedy III court constrained the subjectivity of the transformative use test 
 
 283. See id. 
 284. Compare Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 169 (3d Cir. 2013) (finding that a 
video game with significant creative elements did not pass the transformative use test 
because the plaintiff’s image had not been creatively altered), with ETW Corp. v. Jireh 
Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 938 (6th Cir. 2003) (finding that a work consisting of a collage of 
images was transformative even though the plaintiff’s image was a literal representation). 
 285. See Volokh, supra note 20, at 917–18. 
 286. See Jacy T. Jasmer, ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publishing, Inc.:  A Workable Standard, an 
Unworkable Decision, 5 MINN. INTELL. PROP. REV. 293, 316 (2004). 
 287. Pete Singer, The Three Stooges Latest Act:  Attempting to Define the Scope of 
Protection the First Amendment Provides to Works of Art Depicting Celebrities, Comedy III 
Productions, Inc. v. Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797 (Cal. 2001), 27 U. DAYTON L. REV. 313, 313 
(2002) (quoting Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251–52 (1903) (“It 
would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only in the law to constitute 
themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations, outside of the narrowest and 
most obvious limits.  At the one extreme, some works of genius would be sure to miss 
appreciation . . . At the other end, copyright would be denied to pictures which appealed to a 
public less educated than the judge.”)). 
 288. Whitman, supra note 148, at 44; see also Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 8, 
Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797 (Cal. 2001) (No. 01-368), 2001 
WL 34116904 (noting the “elitism built into the court’s concept of art that is ‘creative’ or 
‘transformative’”). 
 289. Alfred C. Yen, Copyright Opinions and Aesthetic Theory, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 247, 
248–49 (1998). 
 290. Id. 
 291. See Jasmer, supra note 286, at 316. 
 292. Id. at 317. 
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by emphasizing that courts should not be concerned with the quality of the 
art at issue when deciding whether it is transformative.293 
b.   Justifications for the Transformative Use Test 
Despite the flaws of the transformative use test, it also has several 
justifications.  First, the transformative use test provides a uniform 
framework for balancing right of publicity interests against First 
Amendment interests.294  The framework of the transformative use test 
strikes the proper balance between the First Amendment and the right of 
publicity by limiting the number of situations in which a celebrity has a 
right of publicity claim.295  Works that are artistic expressions rather than 
the mere likeness of a celebrity do not threaten the celebrity’s commercial 
value.296  The right of publicity protects individuals’ economic interests in 
their identities; therefore determining whether a work is transformative 
furthers this right of publicity goal.297  Yet, by restricting right of publicity 
claims to “a very narrow universe of expressive works” (non-transformative 
works), the transformative use test protects the First Amendment.298 
Additionally, the transformative use test allows for flexibility in judicial 
decisions.299  The cases that present tension between the First Amendment 
and the right of publicity are “unique and fact-intensive” because they 
involve artistic creations.300  With the transformative use test, courts can 
make “case-by-case determinations on the contribution(s) of authors to the 
specific piece of art at issue.”301 
4.   The Ad-Hoc Balancing Test 
In Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, the Tenth 
Circuit used an ad-hoc balancing test to weigh the plaintiff’s First 
Amendment right to freedom of expression against the defendant’s right of 
publicity.302  Cardtoons produced parody baseball trading cards portraying 
caricatures of major league players.303  As part of its marketing plan, 
Cardtoons advertised its trading cards in a May 1993 issue of Sports 
 
 293. See Comedy III, 21 P.3d at 809–10. 
 294. See Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 162 (3d Cir. 2013). 
 295. Jasmer, supra note 286, at 314–15. 
 296. See Comedy III, 21 P.3d at 808 (“[W]orks of parody or other distortions of the 
celebrity figure are not, from the celebrity fan’s viewpoint, good substitutes for conventional 
depictions of the celebrity and therefore do not generally threaten markets for celebrity 
memorabilia that the right of publicity is designed to protect.”). 
 297. Id. 
 298. Hart, 717 F.3d at 163. 
 299. Id. at 162. 
 300. Jasmer, supra note 286, at 316. 
 301. Id. 
 302. Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959 (10th Cir. 
1996). 
 303. Id. at 962 (noting that 71 out of 130 cards designed and produced by Cardtoons 
featured caricatures of baseball players on the front and “humorous commentary about their 
careers on the back”). 
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Collectors Digest.304  This advertisement caught the attention of the Major 
League Baseball Players Association (MLBPA), who issued cease and 
desist letters to Cardtoons and Champs Marketing, Inc., the printing 
company that Cardtoons had hired.305  In response, Cardtoons filed a suit 
for a declaratory judgment that its cards did not violate MLBPA members’ 
right of publicity.306 
The court first addressed Cardtoons’s First Amendment rights, noting 
that the parody cards are fully protected because they provide “social 
commentary on public figures.”307  The court rejected MLBPA’s contention 
that Cardtoons’s speech is less protected because it does not use a 
traditional medium of expression, citing numerous cases that established 
that the First Amendment also protects nontraditional mediums of 
expression.308  The court also rejected MLBPA’s argument that Cardtoons’s 
cards are commercial speech, noting that the cards “are not transformed into 
commercial speech merely because they are sold for profit.”309 
Once the court determined that Cardtoons’s cards deserved full First 
Amendment protection, it turned to the crux of the case—whether 
Cardtoons’s First Amendment right outweighed MLBPA players’ rights of 
publicity.310  First, the court rejected the defendant’s contention that the 
Lloyd alternative avenues of communication test should be used.311  The 
court explained that restrictions on how a speaker may communicate run “a 
substantial risk of suppressing ideas in the process.”312  In this case, 
Cardtoons could not have effectively depicted its parody without the use of 
player identities.313  Therefore, MLBPA’s attempts to enjoin the parody 
went to the content of the speech.314 
Instead of applying the Lloyd test, the court directly balanced the 
restriction on free speech against the government’s interest in protecting the 
right of publicity.315  This balancing test required two steps:  first, the court 
analyzed “the importance of Cardtoons’s right to free expression and the 
 
 304. Id. at 963. 
 305. Id. 
 306. Id. at 964. 
 307. Id. at 969; see also Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Prods., 603 P.2d 454, 460 (Cal. 
1979) (Bird, C.J., concurring) (noting that the right of publicity does not prohibit “caricature, 
parody and satire”). 
 308. Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 969 (citing Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (flag 
burning) and Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1982) (nude dancing)). 
 309. Id. at 970 (citing Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 
425 U.S. 748, 761 (1976)). 
 310. Id. 
 311. Id. at 971. 
 312. Id.; see also Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 999 (2d Cir. 1989) (noting that a 
“restriction on the location of a speech,” as in Lloyd is “different from a restriction on the 
words the speaker may use”). 
 313. Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 971. 
 314. Id. at 972.  Content-based restraints on expression are subject to strict scrutiny, 
which means that such restraints are constitutional only if they advance a “compelling 
government interest” in the least restrictive way possible. Solantic, L.L.C. v. City of Neptune 
Beach, 410 F.3d 1251, 1258 (11th Cir. 2005). 
 315. Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 972. 
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consequences of limiting that right,” and second, the court weighed “those 
consequences against the effect of infringing on MLBPA’s right of 
publicity.”316 
Addressing the first step of its analysis, the court explained the value of 
parodies in our society.317  As a social criticism, parodies “expose the 
foolish and absurd in society.”318  Furthermore, as a means of self-
expression, parodies allow artists to add new meaning to earlier works.319  
Parodies of celebrities are especially valuable because celebrities play an 
important role in society.320  Therefore, a parody of a celebrity “does not 
merely lampoon the celebrity, but exposes the weakness of the idea or value 
that the celebrity symbolizes in society.”321  Recognizing the value of 
parodies, the court noted that MLBPA’s injunction of Cardtoons would 
reduce future celebrity parodies, which impinges on the First Amendment 
interests in the dissemination of ideas.322 
Next, the court evaluated society’s interest in MLBPA’s publicity 
right.323  The court applied the facts of the Cardtoons case to the 
justifications for the right of publicity.324  After a thorough analysis of the 
economic and noneconomic justifications for the right of publicity, the 
court concluded that the effect of limiting MLBPA’s right of publicity was 
insignificant.325 
a.   Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n 
Considers the Policy Justifications for the Right of Publicity 
The Cardtoons court identified three main policy justifications 
supporting the right of publicity.326  First, the right of publicity protects an 
individual’s personal investment in their public image and prevents others 
from unfairly profiting by appropriating it.327  Second, the right properly 
incentivizes persons toward creative effort and achievement, which enriches 
society.328  Finally, the right protects consumers by protecting them from 
 
 316. Id. 
 317. Id. 
 318. Id. 
 319. See id. 
 320. Id.; see also Tan, supra note 11, at 32–37 (describing the way in which celebrities 
shape individuals’ perceptions of self and society). 
 321. Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 972 (noting that Cardtoons’ trading cards “comment on the 
state of major league baseball by turning images of our sports heroes into modern-day 
personifications of avarice.”). 
 322. Id. at 973 (“The last thing the First Amendment will tolerate, is a law that lets public 
figures keep people from mocking them.”). 
 323. Id. 
 324. Id. 
 325. Id. at 976. 
 326. Id. at 973–76. 
 327. Id. at 975–76; see also Whitman, supra note 148, at 51 (“Courts have recognized 
that celebrities cultivate their talents and public persona and are due a right to the 
commercial value of their efforts in order to prevent others from ‘free riding’ on their 
fame.”). 
 328. Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 973; see also Madow, supra note 9, at 178. 
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“deception and related marketplace harms.”329  This Note refers to these 
arguments as the moral argument, economic argument, and consumer 
protection argument, respectively.  The following three sections evaluate 
the justifications for the right of publicity from the perspective of the 
Cardtoons court, as well as from the perspective of right of publicity 
scholars. 
i.   The Moral Argument 
The moral argument that a celebrity should alone economically benefit 
from his likeness is based upon “visceral impulses of ‘fairness.’”330  This 
argument is based on three premises.  First, because celebrities have 
invested much time and effort into creating their image, they alone should 
be able to control the value of that image.331  Second, “no social purpose is 
served” by allowing others to free ride off the commercial value of a 
celebrity’s image.332  Finally, the right of publicity prevents emotional 
injuries of celebrities who do not wish to have their names linked to any 
commercial uses.333 
Scholars find that the moral argument is weak.334  Celebrities often do 
not create their image alone; many players, such as writers, directors, and 
coaches, help ensure a celebrity’s success.335  In addition to relying on the 
vision and marketing skills of others to create their image, celebrities draw 
“upon a pre-existing body of techniques, tools, and craft knowledge.”336  
Moreover, a celebrity’s fame may have more to do with the interests and 
needs of their audience than with the celebrity’s accomplishments.337 
Similarly, the Cardtoons court did not find the moral argument 
persuasive, noting that publicity rights “are meant to protect against the loss 
of financial gain, not mental anguish.”338  The Eight Circuit echoed the 
Cardtoons reasoning in a similar case involving the right of publicity of 
major league baseball players.339  Noting that noneconomic justifications 
for the right of publicity are unpersuasive, the Eighth Circuit considered 
 
 329. Madow, supra note 9, at 135; see also Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 975.  Such harms 
include consumer confusion regarding whether a “celebrity has endorsed a particular good.” 
Whitman, supra note 148, at 52 (internal quotations omitted). 
 330. MCCARTHY, supra note 24, § 2.1. 
 331. Madow, supra note 9, at 191; see also Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 975 (noting that the 
right of publicity allows “celebrities to enjoy the fruits of their labors” (citing Zacchini v. 
Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 573 (1977))). 
 332. Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 976 (noting that the right of publicity prevents unjust 
enrichment); see also Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 576. 
 333. See Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 976. 
 334. See Madow, supra note 9, at 196; see also Whitman, supra note 148, at 53. 
 335. Whitman, supra note 148, at 53; see also Madow, supra note 9, at 191. 
 336. Madow, supra note 9, at 196 (“Cultural production is always (and necessarily) a 
matter of reworking, re-combining, and redeploying already-existing symbolic forms, sounds 
narratives, and images.”). 
 337. See id. at 189. 
 338. See Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 976. 
 339. C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg., Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media, L.P., 505 
F.3d 818, 824 (8th Cir. 2007). 
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that noneconomic interests supported by the moral argument, such as 
“protecting natural rights, rewarding celebrity labors, and avoiding 
emotional harm,” are better protected by the right to privacy.340 
ii.   The Economic Argument 
The economic argument made in support of the right of publicity was the 
basis of the Supreme Court’s analysis in Zacchini.341  The Court explained 
that the right of publicity incentivizes actors, artists, and athletes who enrich 
society with their talents to spend time and effort developing their talents if 
they know they can protect the use of their image.342 
The Cardtoons court explained that the argument that the right of 
publicity provides an incentive for creativity had been exaggerated because 
celebrities earn a significant income, irrespective of the commercial value 
of their identities.343  Celebrities earn a living through their performances as 
athletes, actors, singers, and other professionals, and they would continue to 
earn a living even without the protections offered by the right of 
publicity.344 
Noting the distinction between the value of a person’s performance and 
the value of his identity, the court criticized the Supreme Court’s analysis in 
Zacchini.345  In Zacchini, the plaintiff had complained of the use of his 
performance, not the use of his identity.346  The Cardtoons court noted that 
the Supreme Court’s reasoning, which was based on an incentives rationale, 
would be more convincing in a right of performance case than in a right of 
publicity case which involved the use of a person’s identity.347 
The court considered the incentives argument to be even less persuasive 
in the context of celebrity parodies.348  The reason celebrities would likely 
not permit parodies of their image is not because they would not make 
money from the parodies but rather because they want to protect themselves 
from ridicule.349  Although the court did not deny that publicity rights 
 
 340. Id. 
 341. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 576–77 (1977). 
 342. Id. at 576. 
 343. Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 973 (comparing copyright law, which protects the primary 
source of an author’s income with the right of publicity which protects a commercial interest 
that is merely a “by-product” of the celebrity’s performance value). 
 344. Id. at 924 (noting the high compensation of many celebrities and pointing to Jim 
Carrey’s $20 million paycheck for one movie).  Some commentators have criticized the 
courts’ references to celebrities’ paychecks when determining whether there has been a 
violation of their right of publicity. See Melissa Desormeaux, When Your Rights Depend on 
Your Paycheck:  The Scary Way Courts Are Deciding Right of Publicity Cases, 12 TUL. J. 
TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 277, 290 (2009).  Most celebrities who bring right of publicity claims 
are very well paid, so the suggestion that because of this, celebrities do not have a right of 
publicity would leave many celebrity plaintiffs without a remedy for harm suffered. Id. 
 345. Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 973. 
 346. See Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 569. 
 347. Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 973. 
 348. Id. at 974. 
 349. Id. 
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provide some incentives for achievement, it concluded that those incentives 
were “reduced or eliminated in the context of celebrity parodies.”350 
Next, the court addressed the argument that the right of publicity 
“promotes the efficient allocation of resources.”351  According to this 
argument, because not everyone can commercially exploit a celebrity’s 
image, the value of that image is preserved.352  Thus, the economic value of 
an identity is higher when that identity is controlled by a limited number of 
people.353  While the court considered this a valid argument in the context 
of advertising, “where repeated use of a celebrity’s likeness to sell products 
may eventually diminish its commercial value,” it was not persuaded by its 
application to non-advertising uses.354 
iii.   The Consumer Protection Argument 
A final rationale for the right of publicity is that it protects consumers 
from “deceptive trade practices.”355  When advertisements depict 
celebrities, there is a risk that consumers will be deceived into thinking that 
the celebrity is endorsing the product that is being advertised.356  As a 
result, they may purchase a product that they would not have otherwise 
purchased.357  Thus, the right of publicity acts as a “mechanism for 
advertising regulation.”358 
The Cardtoons court found this argument inapplicable to the right of 
publicity because the Lanham Act already addresses consumer deception in 
trademark law.359  Rather than protecting consumers, critics argue that “the 
right of publicity grants the celebrity an information monopoly.”360  The 
right of publicity focuses on “the celebrity’s interest in controlling and 
benefiting from the economic value of his identity” rather than on “the 
interest of the consuming public in freedom from deception.”361 
b.   Examining the Merits of the Balancing Test 
Arguably “one of the most significant developments in judging practice 
in the twentieth century,” balancing tests have been abundantly used in 
American jurisprudence.362  The balancing test is justified on three grounds:  
it is “simple, descriptive, and just.”363  Balancing tests involve three 
 
 350. Id. 
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 352. Id. at 974–75. 
 353. See id. at 975. 
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 355. Madow, supra note 9, at 228. 
 356. Id. 
 357. Id. at 229. 
 358. Id. at 228. 
 359. Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 975. 
 360. Whitman, supra note 148, at 54; see also Madow, supra note 9, at 233. 
 361. Madow, supra note 9, at 233. 
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straightforward steps.364  First, the interests that need to be balanced are 
determined; second, the elements of each interest are weighed; and third, 
one interest is determined to outweigh the other.365  This sort of analysis 
can often be easier than “traditional legal reasoning.”366  Additionally, there 
is simplicity in the fact that when a court engages in a balancing test, it 
directly states what it is doing.367  Thus, “the balancing test is a more 
accurate description of judging than the description suggested by 
[traditional legal reasoning].”368 
The simple structure of the balancing test allows judges to consider all of 
the elements that may influence a decision.369  Additionally, it allows for 
flexibility, which leads to more nuanced judicial decisions not bound by 
rigid standards.370  Each time the balancing test is used it is applied to the 
facts of the case at hand, so even a balancing test that has been repeated 
often provides flexibility.371 
Courts have long used a balancing test to weigh society’s interest in free 
speech against government interests to restrain speech.372  In American 
Communications Ass’n v. Douds,373 the Supreme Court stated that when 
faced with conflicting rights, “the duty of the courts is to determine which 
of these two conflicting interests demands the greater protection under the 
particular circumstances presented.”374  Thus, in New York Times Co. v. 
Sullivan,375 the Supreme Court balanced First Amendment interests against 
society’s concern with libel.376  Similarly, in Miller v. California,377 the 
Supreme Court weighed the interests of the First Amendment in assuring 
free discourse against the societal interest in sexually explicit conduct, 
finding that the First Amendment does not protect obscene material.378 
The balancing test is “based on an attractive metaphor—the weighing of 
interests upon a scale of justice.”379  However, use of a balancing test 
means that there is no clear rule or standard by which a speaker can gauge 
whether his speech will be protected.380  Although there is no guarantee of 
how a rule will be applied to a new circumstance, when there is no rule, 
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uncertainty is guaranteed.381  Uncertainty is especially dangerous in the 
context of free speech because “it tends to deter all but the most courageous 
(not necessarily the most rational) [speech] from entering the market place 
of ideas.”382   
While the balancing test offers a nuanced analysis of competing interests, 
the lack of structure inherent in a balancing test may decrease the 
predictability of results.383  Nonetheless, some right of publicity scholars 
believe that in balancing the interests of the right of publicity against the 
First Amendment, the ad-hoc balancing test “best allows” courts to evaluate 
the harms and benefits of the parties involved based on a thorough 
consideration of multiple factors.384 
C.   The Sixth Circuit Combines the Transformative Use Test 
and the Ad-Hoc Balancing Test 
In ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publishing Inc., the Sixth Circuit balanced the 
right of publicity against First Amendment interests by relying on the 
Comedy III transformative use test and the Cardtoons ad-hoc balancing 
test.385  Plaintiff, ETW Corporation, the licensing agent of professional 
golfer Tiger Woods, had the exclusive right to exploit Tiger Woods’s 
publicity rights.386  When “America’s sports artist,” Rick Rush created a 
painting commemorating Tiger Woods’s victory at the 1997 Masters 
Tournament, ETW brought suit against Jireh Publishing, the publisher of 
artist Rick Rush for violation of Woods’s right of publicity.387  First, to 
define the right of publicity, the court referenced the Third Restatement of 
Unfair Competition.388  Next, to balance Woods’s right of publicity against 
Rush’s First Amendment interests, the Sixth Circuit relied on two different 
tests. 
The court looked to the Tenth Circuit’s ad-hoc balancing test used in 
Cardtoons.389  In balancing Woods’s interest against free speech restriction, 
the court noted that Woods, like most celebrities, makes his income through 
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professional golf, which is an activity unrelated to his right of publicity.390 
 
Thus, the court found that a print depicting Woods would likely not “reduce 
the commercial value of his likeness.”391  The court further noted that Rush 
had “added a significant creative component of his own to Woods’s 
identity.”392  Therefore, permitting Woods’s right of publicity to override 
Rush’s freedom of expression would smother Rush’s right to profit from his 
creativity.393  Based on this balancing of Rush’s freedom of expression and 
Woods’s right of publicity, the court found that “society’s interest in 
freedom of artistic expression” outweighed Woods’s right of publicity.394 
Next, the court drew on the transformative use test adopted by the 
Supreme Court of California in Comedy III.395  The court compared Rush’s 
work with the work of the artist in Comedy III:  while the artist in Comedy 
III had created “nearly photographic reproduction of the faces of The Three 
Stooges,” Rush’s prints combined images to “describe, in artistic form, a 
historic event in sports history and to convey a message about the 
significance of Woods’s achievement in that event.”396  Therefore, the court 
found that Rush’s work was sufficiently transformative to warrant First 
Amendment protection.397 
Judge Clay’s dissent characterized the majority’s holding as “disjointed” 
because the majority referenced the Third Restatement of Unfair 
Competition, the Cardtoons test, and the Comedy III test in order to reach 
one conclusion.398  Judge Clay criticized the majority’s analysis as well as 
its outcome, finding instead that the court should have applied the Comedy 
III transformative use test.399  He considered that the transformative use test 
“takes into account all of the competing interests while allowing for a single 
well-determined outcome that provides guidance and adds to the 
jurisprudence as a whole.”400  Applying the transformative use test to the 
facts of the case, Justice Clay found that Rush’s goal had been to create 
“literal, conventional depictions of [Tiger Woods] so as to exploit 
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his . . . fame.”401  Therefore, Judge Clay would have found that Woods’s 
right of publicity outweighed Rush’s freedom of expression.402 
Commentators agree with Judge Clay that the majority’s analysis was 
flawed.403  After a thorough discussion on the background of the right of 
publicity and how other courts have balanced this right against the First 
Amendment, the court’s analysis of the case before it consists of only few 
paragraphs.404  Additionally, the majority combined the Lanham Act and 
the right of publicity analysis, making it difficult to understand which facts 
and law applied to which claims.405 
III.   A PROPOSAL FOR RESOLVING THE TENSION 
A modified version of the ETW approach offers a workable standard for 
resolving the tension between the First Amendment and the right of 
publicity.  Although courts have treated the transformative use test and the 
ad-hoc balancing test as two separate approaches,406 the Sixth Circuit’s use 
of both tests to determine one issue illustrates that the two tests actually 
work in conjunction to create a predictable standard for balancing the First 
Amendment against the right of publicity.  Rather than engaging in two 
separate inquires as the ETW court did, courts should formally incorporate 
the transformative use test into the ad-hoc balancing test to create a more 
comprehensive standard that reliably protects the competing interests at 
stake. 
Part III.A outlines the steps a court would take under this proposed test.  
Part III.B explains why this proposed test offers a predictable standard for 
resolving the still unresolved tension between the First Amendment and the 
right of publicity. 
A.   Applying the Proposed Test 
Under this proposed test, a court would begin by identifying the interests 
to be balanced, the right of publicity versus the First Amendment.  To guide 
its analysis of the right of publicity, the court would call upon the 
transformative use test.  The incorporation of the transformative test at this 
point is particularly effective because the extent to which a piece has been 
transformed can be determinative of whether the traditional justifications 
for recognizing the right of publicity are present. 
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became tired of thinking about the issues and uncomfortably penned a string of conclusions 
as fast as possible to get rid of the case.”). 
 405. Id. 
 406. See, e.g., Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 165 (3d Cir. 2013). 
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The purpose of the transformative use test is directly linked to the 
economic justification for the right of publicity;407 “transformative” works 
that represent the artist’s creative talent rather than a literal depiction of the 
celebrity do not offer “good substitutes for conventional depictions of the 
celebrity” and, therefore, do not threaten the celebrity’s commercial value 
that the right of publicity is meant to protect.408  Therefore, because a 
celebrity’s commercial interests are less likely to be directly threatened by 
transformative works than non-transformative works, assessing the 
transformative nature of a piece is relevant to evaluating the economic 
justifications for recognizing a right of publicity.  A finding that a work is 
transformative would shift the balancing test in favor of the First 
Amendment interests, while a finding that a work is not transformative, but 
rather a literal depiction of the celebrity, would shift the balancing test in 
favor of the right of publicity. 
The extent to which a piece is transformative is also helpful in 
determining whether moral arguments justify recognizing the right of 
publicity in a given case.  The right of publicity recognizes that individuals 
invest in creating their public images and, therefore, it is only fair to allow 
them to own and control the value that they have created.409  Moral 
justifications for the right of publicity also disfavor allowing others to 
unjustly enrich themselves by capitalizing on the work of the celebrity 
whose image they are using.410  However, when a piece is sufficiently 
transformative—that is, when a piece reflects the artist’s creativity and 
talent—its value comes from the labor of the artist, rather than simply from 
the fame of the celebrity depicted.411  Therefore, the artist is not unjustly 
enriching himself because his alterations themselves create value 
independent of that which comes from the celebrity depicted.  Accordingly, 
transformative works shift the balancing test in favor of recognizing the 
First Amendment interests of the artist as a matter of fairness. 
Transformativeness can even inform the consumer protection 
justifications for the right of publicity.  Proponents argue that the right of 
publicity can be used to protect not only the interests of celebrities but also 
the interests of consumers who might purchase products that they 
incorrectly believe are endorsed by a celebrity.412  However, arguably the 
more transformative elements a piece has, the less likely consumers will be 
confused into thinking the piece represents an affiliation or approval of the 
celebrity it depicts. 
Having used the transformative use test to guide its analysis of the right 
of publicity, the court would then weigh the interests of the free speech at 
 
 407. In fact, one of the questions courts may ask when applying the transformative use 
test is whether the work’s value derives primarily from the artist’s creativity or from the 
celebrity’s fame. See supra note 263 and accompanying text. 
 408. Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, 21 P.3d 797, 808 (Cal. 2001); see also 
supra Part II.B.3.b. 
 409. See supra note 330 and accompanying text. 
 410. See supra note 330 and accompanying text. 
 411. See supra note 264 and accompanying text. 
 412. See supra notes 353–55 and accompanying text. 
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issue.  The greater the value the speech adds to society, the more likely it is 
that the First Amendment interests would outweigh the right of publicity 
interests. 
B.   Why the Proposed Test Offers a Workable Standard 
The transformative use test and the ad-hoc balancing test both allow for 
flexibility in judicial decisions.413  Nuanced case-by-case analysis is 
especially desirable when artistic creations are at issue, such as in right of 
publicity cases.414  However, on their own, both tests present flaws that 
reduce the predictability of their application.415  The transformative use test 
offers an unclear definition of what constitutes a transformative use.416  As 
a result, cases applying this test have yielded inconsistent results.417  The 
ad-hoc balancing test lacks a framework to guide courts in their analyses.418  
As a result, judges can draw on a potentially limitless range of factors that 
they believe should be considered when balancing the interests at stake. 
By incorporating the transformative use test into the balancing test, the 
proposed test reduces outcome uncertainty in two significant ways.  First, 
requiring an analysis of the transformative elements of a work allows for a 
more targeted consideration of the competing interests at stake.  Because 
the transformative nature of a piece is directly relevant to determining 
whether the justifications for recognizing a right of publicity are present, the 
incorporation of the transformative use test makes the balancing test more 
uniform and, therefore, more predictable.  Second, retaining the second part 
of the balancing test, which looks beyond the transformative elements of a 
work and addresses the value that the expression at issue adds to society, 
ensures that the transformative elements of a work alone are not dispositive.  
This, in turn, mitigates the danger that the vagueness of the transformative 
use test will lead to an unfair result. 
Combining the transformative use test and the ad-hoc balancing test into 
a single inquiry builds on the strengths of each test while tempering their 
weaknesses.  Therefore, a single unified test provides judges with the best 
approach for determining the line between protecting free speech and 
recognizing an individual’s right of publicity. 
CONCLUSION 
Over thirty years after the Supreme Court noted the tension between the 
First Amendment and the right of publicity, the lower courts still lack a 
consistent method of resolving the conflict between these two laws.  In 
order to maintain the right of publicity while protecting the First 
 
 413. See supra notes 297, 367–69 and accompanying text. 
 414. See supra notes 298–99 and accompanying text. 
 415. See supra Part II.B.3.a; notes 379–82 and accompanying text. 
 416. See supra notes 279–83 and accompanying text. 
 417. See supra notes 282–84 and accompanying text. 
 418. See supra notes 380–81 and accompanying text. 
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Amendment, it is crucial that the courts adopt a uniform standard for 
balancing the right of publicity against the freedom of expression. 
The test proposed in this Note, which is based off of the Sixth Circuit’s 
approach in ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publishing Inc., offers such a standard.  
Combining two already established tests benefits from the best elements of 
each test, while reducing their limitations.  Therefore, courts should adopt 
the proposed test because it creates a predictable standard for balancing the 
First Amendment against the right of publicity. 
